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We discuss the concept of social capital, which has received much attention recently. Social
capital is important for the following 2 key reasons:(1) a highly democratic polity and a strong
economic performance that attaches great importance to the public good can be achieved on the
basis of high social capital;and (2) social capital can effect health status in the human population,
and widening of income inequality harms human health through the erosion of social capital. In
addition, there are 3 political implications of social capital for Japanese society:(1) social capital
has implications for the political decision of whether Japanese society should adopt a “medium
burden for medium welfare” or a “low burden for small welfare” model together with the concept
of social overhead capital;(2) reciprocity, which is one of the primary components of social capital,
is similar to the philosophy underlying the health care system of Japan;(3) Japanese society needs
to change from a society that emphasizes the relationships between its members to a society that
is open to outsiders and has sufficient opportunities.
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We discuss the concept of social capital,  which has received much attention recently.  Social capital is 
important for the following 2 key reasons: (1) a highly democratic polity and a strong economic per-
formance that attaches great importance to the public good can be achieved on the basis of high social 
capital; and (2) social capital can eﬀect health status in the human population,  and widening of income 
inequality harms human health through the erosion of social capital.  In addition,  there are 3 political 
implications of social capital for Japanese society: (1) social capital has implications for the political 
decision of whether Japanese society should adopt a “medium burden for medium welfare” or a “low 
burden for small welfare” model together with the concept of social overhead capital; (2) reciprocity,  
which is one of the primary components of social capital,  is similar to the philosophy underlying the 
health care system of Japan; (3) Japanese society needs to change from a society that emphasizes the 
relationships between its members to a society that is open to outsiders and has suﬃcient opportuni-
ties.
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n recent years,  in developed countries and 
especially in the US,  there have been many 
discussions of “social capital” in various areas of the 
sciences (e.g.,  social epidemiology,  sociology,  politics,  
and economics).  Social capital has become one of the 
most widely studied topics in the ﬁeld of public health,  
and more than 27,000 articles have been published on 
this topic through December 2006 [1].
　 In this article,  we ﬁrst overview the main discus-
sions of social capital.  Then,  we examine the policy 
implications of the concept of social capital for the 
social security system of Japan.
The Concept and Importance of Social Capital
　 A strong society makes a strong economy and 
a strong state. According to Coleman [2],  there 
are 3 types of capital; “physical capital” is used for 
the production of materials and machines,  “human 
capital” is embodied in the skill and knowledge 
acquired by an individual,  and “social capital” is 
embedded in the relationships among people.  The 
relationship between human capital and social capital 
is analogous to the relationship between points and 
lines.  Let us assume that A is a parent and B is a 
child of A.  If A educates B,  A must have human 
capital,  and there exists social capital that is 
expressed by the line AB.
　 In this section, we discuss Making Democracy Work      
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by Robert Putnam,  which shows the importance of 
social capital and has had a major impact on the argu-
ments that followed.  He describes the situation in Italy 
in 1970,  when the centralized administrative frame-
work was demolished and decentralization was 
adopted,  and points out that there has been much 
inequality between southern and northern Italy in 
terms of the political and economic performance of the 
local governments.  He examines the relationship 
between the performance of local government and the 
civic-ness of the local population.  Putnam measured 
the government performance as an integrated index 
based on 12 variables (e.g.,  legislative innovation,  day 
care centers,  housing and urban development,  family 
clinics,  and so on),  and measured the civic-ness of the 
population as an integrated index based on 4 variables 
(i.e.,  the activity of local associations,  the incidence of 
newspaper readership,  tournament in referenda,  and 
the incidence of preference voting).  In his results,  
these indexes are highly correlated (r＝0.92),  indicat-
ing that there are strong associations between the 
performance of local government and the civic-ness of 
the local population.
　 In northern Italy,  the civic-ness as measured by the 
civic community index was high,  and the political and 
economic performance of the local government were 
also high.  In contrast,  in southern Italy,  both the 
civic-ness and the performance were low.  Putnam 
showed that social capital is a clearly deﬁned basis of 
the civic-ness.  Social capital is deﬁned as follows 
[3].
Voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that 
has inherited a substantial stock of social capital,  in 
the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement.  Social capital here refers to features of 
social organization,  such as trust,  norms,  and net-
works that can improve the eﬃciency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions.
　 He also cites Colemanʼs deﬁnition as follows [3];       
Like other forms of capital,  social capital is produc-
tive,  making possible the achievement of certain ends 
that would not be attainable in its absence… .  For 
example,  a group whose members manifest trustwor-
thiness and place extensive trust in one another will 
be able to accomplish much more than a comparative 
group lacking that trustworthiness and trust… .  In a 
farming community…where one farmer got his hay 
baled by another and where farm tools are extensively 
borrowed and lent,  the social capital allows each 
farmer to get his work done with less physical capital 
in the form of tools and equipment.
　 The political and economic performance of the 
society and the organization rises if people cooperate 
in terms of collaborative activity in the apartment 
house,  management of communal land for agriculture 
and ﬁsheries,  and expenditure on public goods.  
However,  in a society like southern Italy,  such coop-
eration was not common and the standard of living 
suﬀered as a result.
　 As an example that such “dilemmas of collective 
action” have been overcome and that voluntary coop-
eration occurs in the community,  he showed some 
types of mutual aid,  for instance,  the rotating credit 
associations observed in many countries (which consist 
of a group of people who agree to make regular con-
tributions to a fund which is given,  in whole or in 
part,  to each contributor in rotation),  Arisan in 
Indonesia,  and KOU in Japan.  It is easy for members 
of a community that accumulates social capital to help 
each other,  and mutual aid leads to strengthening 
social ties in the community as follows,  according to 
Putnam [3]: “The greater the level of trust within a 
community,  the greater the likelihood of cooperation.  
And cooperation breeds trust.  The steady accumula-
tion of social capital is a crucial part of the story 
behind the virtuous circles of civic Italy.”
　 Putnam gives a strong account that trust,  the norm 
of reciprocity and the network of civic engagements 
form the contents of social capital.  With regard to the 
relationships among these components,  the norm of 
reciprocity and civic engagements are assumed to be 
the source of trust.
　 In this context,  reciprocity is the attitude of 
appreciating mutual aid.  Putnam discusses reciprocity 
as follows [3].
Each individual act in a system of reciprocity is usu-
ally characterized by a combination of what one might 
call short-term altruism and long-term self-interest: I 
help you now in the (possibly vague,  uncertain and 
uncalculating) expectation that you will help me out in 
the future.  Reciprocity is made up of a series of acts 
each of which is short-run altruistic (beneﬁting others 
at a cost to the altruist) but which together typically 
make every participant better oﬀ.
　 A mutual aid based on reciprocity has been ﬁxed 
through the fact that it is seen daily and has played the 
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role as the norm.  Thus,  if the exchanges and com-
munications based on reciprocity have been continued 
over a long period of time,  it is assumed that trust is 
strengthened further through the formation of a 
tightly-knit social network.
　 On the other hand,  the level of cooperation in the 
society and its political and economic performance are 
aﬀected by the existing social network.  Putnam dis-
cusses the social network as follows [3].
Some of these networks are primarily “horizontal”,  
bringing together agents of equivalent states and 
power.  Others are primarily “vertical, ” linking 
unequal agents in asymmetric relations of hierarchy 
and dependence. …
Networks of civic engagement,  like the neighborhood 
associations,  choral societies,  cooperatives,  sports 
clubs,  mass-based parties, …represent intense hori-
zontal interaction. …The denser such networks in a 
community,  the more likely that its citizens will be 
able to cooperate for mutual beneﬁt.
　 Examples from northern and southern Italy are 
given.  In northern Italy,  there has historically been 
variously horizontal mutual aid systems,  and citizens 
have freely used property and have been able to solve 
the dilemma of collective action.  In southern Italy,  
interpersonal relationships have been vertical and 
cooperation did not occur among citizens,  as they 
could not overcome the problem of mistrust and could 
not avoid frequent strikes.
　 Putnam describes his conclusion as follows [3].
Over the 2 decades since the birth of the regional 
governments,  civic regions have grown faster than 
regions with fewer associations and more hierarchy,  
controlling for their level of development in 1970.  Of 
2 regions equally advanced economically in 1970,  the 
one with a denser network of civic engagement grew 
signiﬁcantly faster in the ensuing years.  Similarly, …
civic associations are powerfully associated with 
eﬀective public institutions.  The theory sketched in 
this chapter helps explain why social capital,  as 
embodied in horizontal networks of civic engagement,  
bolsters the performance of the polity and the econ-
omy,  rather than the reverse: Strong society,  strong 
economy; strong society,  strong state.
　 Thus,  Putnam clariﬁed that in societies where 
social capital is enhanced,  democracy functions eﬀec-
tively and a high level of economic achievement is made 
possible.
　 Social capital and policy. In “The Health of 
Nations: Why Inequality Is Harmful to Your Health”,  
Kawachi & Kennedy showed that in the US there 
were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in social capital between 
states by measuring indicators such as those used by 
Putnam (e.g.  participation in voluntary associations,  
interpersonal trust,  and reciprocity).  These state 
levels of social capital were signiﬁcantly associated 
with the voting rates of the states,  and even at the 
individual level there were diﬀerences in political 
participation between poor and rich people [4].
　 The diﬀerences between states in the US were 
partly explained by the political culture that was the 
underlying basis of that state.  Elazar categorized 
political culture in the US into 3 types: moralistic,  
traditionalistic,  and individualistic.  First,  the moral-
istic political culture here emphasizes the common-
wealth conception as the basis for government and 
resembles the civic culture described by Putnam in 
northern Italy: “Good government,  then,  is measured 
by the degree to which it promotes the public good in 
terms of the honesty,  selﬂessness and commitment to 
the public welfare of those who govern”.  The states 
with this type of political culture are “those settled by 
the Puritans of New England and their Yankee 
descendants”,  in particular,  the New England states,  
Michigan,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  and Iowa.  In con-
trast,  the traditionalistic political culture reﬂects “an 
older,  pre-commercial attitude that accepts a substan-
tially hierarchical society as part of the ordered 
nature of things,  authorizing and expecting those at 
the top of the social structure to take a special and 
dominant role in government.” They are rooted in a 
more paternalistic and elitist conception of the com-
monwealth and resemble southern Italy “where politics 
tends to be dominated by vertical patron-client rela-
tionships”.  Geographically,  these states are south-
eastern states,  e.g.,  Virginia,  South Carolina,  and 
Georgia,  where “the people who settled…sought 
opportunity in a plantation-centered agricultural sys-
tem based on slavery.” Last,  the individualistic politi-
cal culture “places a premium on limiting community 
intervention－whether governmental or non-govern-
mental－into private activities to the minimum neces-
sary to keep the marketplace in proper working 
order”.  This type of political culture emphasizes 
market-based principles,  and the government is estab-
lished on the basis of utilitarianism.  Geographically,  
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these states are Midwestern states where the immi-
grants from England and Germany who sought oppor-
tunities in the New World settled [4].
　 Kawachi and Kennedy point out that “From the 
description of Elazarʼs typology,  one would predict 
that stocks of social capital would tend to be low in 
regions of America historically dominated by tradi-
tionalistic political culture,  whereas they would tend 
to be high in areas characterized by moralistic cul-
ture.” The indicators of social capital and the indica-
tors deﬁned by Elazarʼs political culture were shown 
to be strongly associated [4].
Income Inequality,  Social Capital and Health
　 The eﬀect of income inequality on health.
Kawachi et al.  [5] explore the associations among 
income inequality,  social capital and health.
　 There are 2 mechanisms by which income inequal-
ity and health are linked.  First,  as there are “concave 
relationships” between income and health (Fig.  1),  the 
eﬀect on health of the income increase gradually 
declines.  As a whole,  if there are 2 societies that have 
the same mean income,  the more egalitarian society 
has a longer life expectancy.  If the mean income does 
not change,  widening inequality within the society will 
decrease life expectancy by this “concavity eﬀect.” The 
second mechanism is independent of the above mecha-
nism,  and is called the “pollution eﬀect.” Income 
inequality shifts the curve between income and health 
downwards (Fig.  2).  Therefore,  “at the same level of 
income,  individuals living in a more unequal society 
experience a worse level of health compared to indi-
viduals living in a more egalitarian society.” The 
“pollution eﬀect” is caused by (1) adverse health 
eﬀects due to relative deprivation and (2) the erosion 
of social capital and the decrease in public goods 
expense.
　 The ﬁrst cause of the pollution eﬀect suggests that 
dissatisfaction and stress caused by social comparison 
harm health.  In this instance,  “they deﬁned an indi-
vidualʼs degree of relative deprivation according to the 
distance between their income and that of others in 
certain “reference (or comparison) groups,” con-
structed based on combinations of race,  education,  
age-group and state of residence”.  The data showed 
that widening the extent of relative deprivation 
increased not only cause-speciﬁc mortality but mortal-
ity due to all causes.
　 In the second cause of the pollution eﬀect,  the 
existence of income inequality leads to harm to health 
by decreasing social capital.  The results from the 
experimental economics provide evidence of this.  In 
these experiments,  tokens are distributed to the par-
ticipants,  and they can freely invest in both private 
and public accounts.  In the private accounts they can 
earn proﬁts via ﬁxed interest,  and in the public 
accounts they can earn greater proﬁts if the amounts 
of their total investments increase.  These situations 
resemble the “Dilemmas of Prisoners” in Game 
Theory.  It is quite interesting that if the distribution 
before the game is skewed,  and the participants know 
this,  the amount of public accounts is signiﬁcantly 
decreased.  It is concluded that “the results of this 
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Fig. 1　 Theoretical relationship between income and life 
expectancy.
Life Expectancy
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Fig. 2　 Downward shift in the income/health curve (“pollution 
eﬀect”).
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study provide novel support for recent claims that 
inequality has important “psychosocial” eﬀects that 
reduce the tendency for cooperation in collective 
action problem.”
　 The relationship between the decline of social 
capital and harm to health is explained by the ﬁnding 
that in the US spending on social security (proportion 
of the limit of welfare beneﬁts to income per capita) is 
less in the states that have lower social capital.  In 
addition,  voting rates among voters at lower socioeco-
nomic strata and spending on social security at the 
state level are strongly correlated.
　 Kawachi et al.  [4] explain “The social and political 
culture of these places (which have low social capital 
and invest a little in welfare; annotation by JH) trun-
cate the range of social opportunities available to the 
poor,  and thereby increase their vulnerability to ill 
health.” Kawachi et al.  [6] showed that in 39 states in 
the US,  income inequality and social capital (mea-
sured as participation in voluntary associations and 
social mistrust) were signiﬁcantly associated,  and 
these social capital indicators and mortality both from 
all causes and from coronary heart disease were also 
associated.
　 The relationship between social capital and 
health. As described above,  the relationship 
between income inequality and health is consistently 
clear in the US; however,  the relationship is less 
clear in more egalitarian countries (e.g.,  Japan).  
According to Kawachi and colleagues [5],  “there 
appears to be a threshold eﬀect of income inequality 
on health,  such that the impact of inequality becomes 
evident only above a certain threshold level”.
　 Hashimoto [7] discusses whether income inequal-
ity aﬀects populationsʼ health negatively or not,  and 
points out that “It must be clariﬁed which is the cause 
of harm to health: concave eﬀect (expressed by indi-
vidual income level) or the direct pollution eﬀect 
(expressed as the populationʼs income inequality).” 
There was inconsistency among the results of studies 
on income inequality that were conducted by multilevel 
analysis and published in the 90s,  as Subramanian et 
al.  [8] pointed out; these inconsistencies included (1) 
how to deal with individual income,  (2) how to deal 
with the mean or median income of the area,  (3) how 
to deal with areas as dummy variables,  and (4) the 
methodology of statistical analysis.  Additionally,  
Hashimoto claims that the theoretical framework link-
ing income inequality as a characteristic of the area to 
individual health status is thus eroded (or such frame-
work is not existing) and therefore the value of the 
model being evaluated is also eroded.  Furthermore,  
there is consensus,  theoretically and empirically,  that 
populations with high income inequality have lower 
health status than populations with low income 
inequality.  On the other hand,  Hashimoto points out 
that extensive future studies including correlation 
study and qualitative study are needed to elucidate the 
eﬀect of mechanisms other than absolute income.
　 Kondo [9] notes,  as one of the results from the 
AGES (Aichi Gerontological Evaluation Study) proj-
ect,  that areas with a low level of social capital indi-
cators have more “inappropriate care groups.” He also 
summarizes the criticisms of the concept and deﬁnition 
of social capital,  and concludes that “the individual 
relationships between social capital and health are 
already established by the contribution of many pro-
spective studies.  The societal relationships between 
social capital and health,  however,  are not clearly 
demonstrated regardless of being intuitively accept-
able and being attractive hypothesis.”
Discussion
　 Social capital and social overhead capital.
Aside from social capital,  there is another concept 
known as social overhead capital that is used in insti-
tutional economics.  According to Uzawa,  social 
overhead capital can be categorized into 3 compo-
nents: natural environment,  social infrastructure,  
and institutional capital.  Of these,  institutional capi-
tal includes a wide variety of institutions,  for exam-
ple,  medical care,  education,  and public administra-
tion.  He elaborates on the concept as follows [10].
- Social overhead capital refers to the social instru-
ment that makes it possible for the people who live in 
a given country or speciﬁc area to pursue an aﬄuent 
economic life,  develop a ﬁne culture,  and maintain a 
humanly attractive society in a sustainable and stable 
manner.  Social overhead capital has the essential role 
of protecting the dignity of each person,  supporting 
the independent spirit,  and maintaining basic civic 
rights at a maximum level.
- Social overhead capital,  in other words,  is embodied 
by institutional conditions that allow the decentralized 
market economy to function smoothly and that stabi-
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lize the material income distribution.
- Therefore,  social overhead capital must not be 
bureaucratically controlled as part of the governing 
system of a nation,  and must not be inﬂuenced by 
market conditions as a target of proﬁt seeking.  Each 
component of social overhead capital should be con-
trolled and maintained based on expert knowledge and 
norms.
　 From this point of view,  institutional economics 
considers medical care on the basis of rights that 
“should be distributed to people equally,  independent 
of income and possessions,  because medical care is 
made up of goods and services that are essential for 
human life,  and consuming medical care is a right of 
citizenship based on the right of survival” [11].  The 
statement below from Kenjo [12] on social security 
takes the same point of view.
Social security addresses the question of how a soci-
ety works in which members can live humanly,  enjoy 
the dynamism of the market,  and have opportunities 
to foster their inherently endowed talents are equally 
open to all members.  In such a society,  members 
should be able to utilize services (e.g.,  medical care,  
nursing care for the elderly and disabled,  child care,  
and education) regardless of income,  residence,  or 
gender; in the society these are considered a common 
land,  and the free market which is enclosed by the 
common land is dynamically workable.
　 Therefore,  an institutional economics that values 
social overhead capital intends to construct an aﬄuent 
society,  and has some commonalities with the position 
of Putnam that traditional democratic societies in 
northern Italy and the northeastern United States 
represent realizations of the ideal.
　 Originally,  according to the institutional economics 
of Veblen,  an institution in one society is “not a prod-
uct which one universal and integrated principle made 
it logically and deductively,  but is a product that is 
made from mixture of ethical,  societal,  cultural,  and 
natural conditions in each countries or areas” [10].  
Appropriate institutions for a particular society are 
assumed to be constructed through the democratic 
process.
　 In this context,  taking into account the works of 
Putnam,  the determinant of the political and economic 
performances of institutions within the “ethical,  soci-
etal,  cultural,  and natural conditions” is social capital,  
which consists of trust,  norms,  and social participa-
tion,  and in a society that has suﬃcient social capital 
it is easy for social overhead capital to develop 
because the public good and reciprocity are empha-
sized.
　 The social security system of Japan now has rela-
tively small burdens to citizens and can be described 
as exhibiting “small burdens for medium welfare”; for 
example,  the ratio of medical costs to GDP (gross 
domestic product) is the lowest among OECD coun-
tries,  and on the other hand the national burden rate 
is the lowest after the US.  Japan needs to decide 
whether to proceed toward a situation of “small bur-
dens for small welfare” or of “medium burdens for 
medium welfare” considering social security as a pub-
lic-interest service.  From the viewpoint of social 
capital or social overhead capital,  the latter would 
make Japan a society in which citizens can live 
humanly with dignity and enjoy the dynamism of the 
market.
　 The question arises as to which concept,  social 
capital or social overhead capital,  should be consid-
ered,  measured,  and targeted when setting policy.  
For instance,  when we compare the social security 
performances of local governments with regard to the 
promotion of local politics,  comparing the indicators 
of healthcare deﬁned by the concept of social overhead 
capital is easy to do and is readily understood by the 
public.  On the other hand,  it is useful to compare the 
indicators deﬁned by social capital to decide how to 
invest the limited healthcare resources of the local 
government.  Thus,  it is valid that we utilize both 
concepts.
　 Social capital and social security system in 
Japan; from the viewpoint of reciprocity. The 
social security system of Japan is sometimes said to 
represent a “combination of self-help,  reciprocity,  
mutual help,  public help”.  Here each term is deﬁned 
as follows: self-help is deﬁned as “egoism”; reciprocity 
is deﬁned as “egoism with mutual help” (which includes 
the practice of helping others in the hope of getting 
help from others in the future in return); mutual help 
is deﬁned as “altruism with mutual help”; and public 
help is deﬁned as “altruism”.  [13] For example,  a 
health care insurance system that is characterized by 
universal coverage covers medical services for the 
treatment of diseases and injuries of the participants 
themselves and their families through compulsory 
participation; however,  participants in younger age 
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groups must pay for the medical care costs of partici-
pants in older groups (in the same way,  those who do 
not have diseases must pay for those who have chronic 
diseases).  If the insurance were managed by the pri-
vate sector,  insured persons would pay an insurance 
cost that is appropriate to their health risks on the 
basis of balancing the cost and beneﬁt.  However,  in 
the health care insurance system of Japan,  which is 
based on social insurance,  insured persons who have 
no disease and earn high income pay for much of the 
cost.  Therefore,  these systems of Japan are combina-
tions of egoism in the broad sense of the term (the 
component of the insurance principle of the social 
insurance system) and altruism (the social policy com-
ponent) [14].
　 Putnam writes that “generalized reciprocity refers 
to a continuing relationship of exchange that is any 
given time unrequited or imbalanced,  but that involves 
mutual expectations that a beneﬁt granted now should 
be repaid in the future” and that “the norm of general-
ized reciprocity serves to reconcile self-interest and 
solidarity” [3].  At the base of the Japanese system,  
there is a principle of mutual help much like these 
“norms of reciprocity”.
　 In the early Showa period (the Showa period began 
in 1926) in agricultural communities in Japan,  social 
solidarity was developed through community collective 
action,  and the individuals who had grown up in agri-
cultural communities went to urban areas to work for 
many Japanese companies.  Thus,  in these companies 
a community spirit or customs of mutual help (e.g.  
congratulatory or condolence payments,  leave) devel-
oped,  as in rural communities.  The health care sys-
tem of Japan was born on the basis of solidarity 
between both “Mura (rural communities)” and “Kaisha 
(companies), ” and the universal coverage system was 
introduced in 1961.  Now,  however,  the previous 
community spirit or solidarity has disappeared in both 
rural communities and companies,  so the delicate 
problem arises of determining on what solidarity the 
Japanese system is based and what social capital pro-
duces this solidarity.  Further empirical studies should 
be conducted on the transition and present status of 
social capital in Japan.  However,  (1) citizens expect 
equal medical services according to many public opin-
ion surveys [15],  (2) care insurance system was 
transformed into law in 2000 and is supported by most 
citizens,  and the supply of care services has been 
considerably increased based on citizensʼ “reciprocity,  
mutual help,  public help”,  and (3) resistance to the 
increasing burden still remains,  but most citizens 
accept tax increases for social security.  As shown in 
the public opinion survey implemented by Yomiuri 
Shinbun in November 2007,  50ｵ think that “tax 
increases are not inevitable to maintain the social 
security system”,  and on the other hand 48ｵ think 
otherwise.  From these points,  it is certain that there 
are the attitudes that emphasize the social security as 
a public good based on social solidarity in Japan.
　 Reaction to the concept of social capi-
tal; trust. Recent attention to the concept of 
social capital mainly in the US is rooted in the per-
ception that a decrease in social capital,  especially of 
trust,  in Western societies has a harmful eﬀect on 
economic and political performance.  We are also 
interested in the argument about social capital because 
it is possible that in Japan the decline of trust,  which 
is one of the most important factors in social capital,  
is caused by social insecurity resulting from the col-
lapse of the “Japanese System” (e.g.,  widening income 
inequality,  the end of the lifetime employment system).  
The reaction to the concept of social capital diﬀers 
depending on whether Japan has a high level of social 
trust or not.
　 According to an international comparative study 
involving 7 countries conducted by the Institute of 
Statistical Mathematics (1988),  to the question 
“Would you say that most of the time people try to be 
helpful or that they are mostly looking out for them-
selves?”,  54ｵ in the US and 31ｵ in Japan 
responded “people try to be helpful”.  To the question 
“Do you think that most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got the chance,  or would they 
try to be fair?”,  56ｵ in the US and 53ｵ in Japan 
responded “they try to be fair”.  To the question 
“Generally speaking,  would you say that most people 
can be trusted or you cannot be too careful in dealing 
with people?”,  42ｵ in the US and 39ｵ in Japan 
responded “most people can be trusted”.  As a whole,  
these results show that trust is higher in the US than 
in Japan.  Among 7 countries (i.e.,  US,  Japan,  Italy,  
France,  Germany,  Holland,  and Britain),  Japan had 
a level of trust that placed them in the middle of the 
group.  The diﬀerence between the US and Japan was 
also shown in experiments involving social dilemmas in 
the area of social psychology; thus,  the diﬀerence 
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aﬀects not only perceptions but also actual behaviors 
[16].
　 In the following we introduce Yamagishiʼs concept 
of trust [17].  Dealing with the concept of trust,  ﬁrst 
he suggests that “the diﬀerence should be clearly dis-
tinguished between (1) trust as a expectation regarding 
the capability of others,  and (2) trust as a expectation 
regarding the intentions of others”,  then described 
that,  in the case of (2),  there are 2 diﬀerent types of 
trust: trust and relief.  The former concept of “trust” 
is based on the perception of the tendency of the 
actions of others in relation to oneself,  and it aﬀects 
the evaluation of othersʼ personalities,  friendliness,  
and aﬀections toward oneself.  On the other hand,  the 
latter concept of “relief” is associated with how othersʼ 
behaviors aﬀect othersʼ interests.  In other words,  one 
thinks that others are not likely to act in such a way 
as to cause a loss for themselves.
　 At this time,  Japan has a group mentality and has 
developed the “Japanese System” characterized by 
lifetime employment in the company,  Keiretsu busi-
ness (dealings mainly only among family companies),  
and cross-shareholdings between companies.  In the 
Japanese medical world,  medical schools have supplied 
doctors to their associate hospitals and in return these 
doctors keep their posts for the long-term.  Thus they 
have reduced the uncertainty that comes from dealings 
or human relationships and have developed a “society 
with relief”.  However,  after the bubble economy col-
lapsed,  the Japanese economy was exposed to global-
ism,  and the transaction cost of the “Japanese 
System” became expensive.  Thus,  Yamagishi claims 
that a society with relief faces crises.  According to 
him,  such crises are diﬀerent from the crises of a 
“society with trust” based on traditional civic society 
in western countries,  in that societies with trust 
among autonomous individuals are not based on 
“warmth from group mentality” as are societies with 
relief.
　 Furthermore,  trust has the eﬀect of “strengthen-
ing” which stabilizes mutual ties through mutual trust.  
At the same time,  trust has the eﬀect of “expansion”,  
in that new outside relationships are constructed 
beyond relationships between members.  The results 
from social psychology show that the latter eﬀect does 
not occur in a society that emphasizes the relationship 
between members,  like Japan,  which has a group 
mentality.
　 The concept of social capital shows that society 
high in trust can enjoy good health and pursue high 
economic and political performance.  To change 
Japanese society from a “society with relief” to a 
“society with trust”,  it is necessary to develop a social 
intelligence that “is based on guessing othersʼ actions 
by thinking from their points of view” in place of the 
social view that excludes outside members and does not 
allow strangers to be trusted.  It is empirically shown 
that such an intelligence could be developed in an 
appropriate social and educational environment with 
many opportunities for building trust.  In addition,  
information disclosure and transparency of the deci-
sion-making process in the public actions of each 
organization and especially in politics should be 
emphasized as a social device for improving trust 
through supporting this social intelligence and reduc-
ing uncertainty.  The possibility and importance of 
information sharing in voluntary associations has also 
been described [18].
Conclusions
　 We have discussed 3 political implications of social 
capital for Japanese society and for our social security 
system: (1) From the view point of social capital and 
social overhead capital,  we should aim to have a 
society exhibiting “medium burden for medium wel-
fare” rather than “low burden for small welfare”; this 
may promote the stability and the development of our 
society.
　 (2) Reciprocity, which is one of the primary com-        
ponents of social capital,  is similar to the philosophy 
in which the health care system of Japan is rooted,  and 
we Japanese still have attitudes that emphasize social 
security as a public good based on social solidarity.
　 (3) Japanese society needs to change from being a         
“society with relief” that emphasizes relationships 
within members to a “society with trust” that is open 
to others and has suﬃcient opportunities for outsid-
ers.
　 In order to make our current society,  which is 
decreasing in population and is rapidly aging,  into a 
more pleasant and desirable society to live in,  we need 
to strengthen social solidarity,  which is represented 
by social capital.  At present it is very diﬃcult for us 
to answer the questions: “Hereafter,  what would be 
the basis of social solidarity in Japan,  and how should 
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we retain it?” The theory of social capital,  however,  
which emphasizes horizontal networks of civic engage-
ment and the virtuous circle of social solidarity and 
mutual aid based on the norm of reciprocity,  clariﬁes 
the course Japan should take in the future.
References
 1. Kawachi I,  Subramanian SV and Kim D: Social Capital and 
Health; in Social Capital and Health,  Kawachi I,  Subramanian SV 
and Kim D eds,  Springer Science＋Business Media,  New York 
(2008) pp 1ﾝ26.
 2. Coleman J: Foundations of Social Theory.  Harvard University 
Press,  Cambridge Massachusetts (1990): transl.  by Kuji T, :
Syakai Riron no Kiso,  Aoki Shoten,  Tokyo (2004) pp 471ﾝ501 (in 
Japanese).
 3. Putnam R: Making Democracy Work.  Princeton University Press,  
Princeton N.J.  (1993) pp 163ﾝ185.
 4. Kawachi I and Kennedy B: The Health of Nations: Why Inequality 
Is Harmful to Your Health,  The New Press,  New York (2002) pp 
161ﾝ190.
 5. Kawachi I,  Fujisawa Y and Takao S: The Health of Japanese-
What can we learn from America? Hoken-Iryo-Kagaku (2007) 
56: 114ﾝ121.
 6. Kawachi I,  Kennedy B,  Lochner K and Prothrow-Stith D: Social 
Capital,  Income Inequality,  and Mortality.  Am J Public Health 
(1997) 87: 1491ﾝ1498.
 7. Hashimoto H: Income Distribution and Health; in Social Disparity 
and Health,  Kawakami N,  Kobayashi Y and Hashimoto H eds,  
University of Tokyo Press,  Tokyo (2006) pp 37ﾝ60 (in Japanese).
 8. Subramanian SV and Kawachi I : Income Inequality and 
Health; What have we learned so far? Epidemiol Rev (2004) 
26: 78ﾝ91.
 9. Kondo K: Social Relationship and Health; in Social Disparity and 
Health,  Kawakami N,  Kobayashi Y and Hashimoto H eds,  
University of Tokyo Press,  Tokyo (2006) pp 163ﾝ185 (in Japanese).
10. Uzawa H: Social Overhead Capital.  Iwanami Shoten,  Tokyo (2000):
pp 2ﾝ10 (in Japanese).
11. Kenjo Y: An Inquiry into Medical Care and Pension Systems.  Keio 
University Press,  Tokyo (2006): pp 23ﾝ58 (in Japanese).
12. Kenjo Y: An Inquiry into Medical Care and Pension Systems.  Keio 
University Press,  Tokyo (2006): pp 607ﾝ619 (in Japanese).
13. Tsutsumi S: The Structural Turnabout of Social Security.  Shakai 
Hoken Kenkyujo.  Tokyo (2004): pp 11ﾝ16 (in Japanese).
14. Hamada J: The Theoretical Situation of Health Policy.  Okayama 
Igakkai Zasshi (J Okayama Med Assoc) (2007) 119: 131ﾝ136 (in 
Japanese).
15. Tamura M: Why do many citizens oppose the introduction of medi-
cal disparity? Shakai Hoken Junpo (2003) 2192: 6ﾝ15 (in 
Japanese).
16. Yamagishi T: From Society with Relief to Society with Trust.  
Chuokoron-Shinsha,  Tokyo (1999) pp 25ﾝ54 (in Japanese).
17. Yamagishi T: From Society with Relief to Society with Trust.  
Chuokoron-Shinsha,  Tokyo (1999) pp 2ﾝ23 (in Japanese).
18. Yamagishi T: From Society with Relief to Society with Trust.  
Chuokoron-Shinsha,  Tokyo (1999) pp 208ﾝ248 (in Japanese).
283Policy Implications of Social CapitalOctober 2008
9
Hamada and Takao: Policy Implications of Social Capital for the Japanese Social Sec
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
10
Acta Medica Okayama, Vol. 62 [2008], Iss. 5, Art. 1
http://escholarship.lib.okayama-u.ac.jp/amo/vol62/iss5/1
